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Abstract
The NBA is widely known as the least competitively balanced professional sports league
in North America. Past literature has shown that as competitive balance declines, so does fan
interest and revenues for both individual teams and the league as a whole. In 2003, the NBA
implemented a luxury tax,a penalty mechanism that taxes teams who spend above the salary cap,
in order to improve competitive balance. Using luxury tax and league level production data from
the 1998 to 2016 NBA seasons, and a model that estimates competitive balance, this paper
investigates whether the implementation of the luxury tax in 2003 positively affected competitive
balance in the NBA. The results indicate that competitive balance significantly improved from
2003 to 2012 compared to the seasons prior to the implementation of the luxury tax.
Additionally, I find that the more teams pay in luxury tax, the worse competitive balance
becomes, suggesting that as teams stockpile more talent, the league becomes competitively
imbalanced as a result.
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1

Introduction
In 2010, LeBron James, widely considered to be the best basketball player in the world,

decided to team up with two perennialall-stars: Dwyane Wade and Chris Bosh. This was the first
time in NBA history that three of the most talented players in the world decided to leave their
respective franchises, team up with other all-stars, and compete for an NBA championship. With
their extraordinary success, winning two NBA championships in four seasons, a new era in
basketball was created: the super team era. Since then, all-stars like Kevin Durant, Jimmy Butler,
Paul George, and Carmelo Anthony have left their franchises in order to compete for
championships with other all-stars(Bontemps, 2017). As a result of the new super team era, a few
teams with an extraordinary amount of talent compete for NBA championships, while the rest of
the league is lost without a franchise player. This created a competitive balance issue that the
NBA had never seen before.
Competitive balance is the degree of parity or equality among teams in a sports league
(Leeds, 2016). It is essential to both individual franchises and the league as a whole to be
somewhat competitively balanced. Both El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) and Coates and Humphreys
(2012) find that fan attendance drops when a league is less competitively balanced.
Consequently, there is less money to be made by both individual franchises and the league as a
whole when fan interest declines. Because of the NBA’s awareness of the importance of
competitive balance, they implemented policies including a salary cap and luxury tax meant to
evenly disperse talent throughout the NBA and improve competitive balance. The salary cap is
the maximum amount of money a team can spend on player salaries, while the luxury tax is a
penalty mechanism that taxes teams for overspending above the salary cap (Coon, 2017).
Although the NBA has several policies that attempt to control fluctuations in competitive

4

balance, the salary cap and specifically the luxury tax may be the NBA’s greatest mechanism of
defense in controlling competitive balance. With the super team era considerably affecting the
NBA’s competitive balance, those policies have recently come into question.
As recently as 2013, the NBA increased the tax rate of the luxury tax in order to further
incentivize teams to not over spend on player talent, but it is unknown whether competitive
balance has improved.While there is a great deal of literature involving competitive balance in
the world of sports, no paper has utilized data from the NBA toanalyze the potential effect of the
NBA luxury tax on competitive balance. I attempt to fill the gap in literature by examining the
effectiveness of combating competitive balance issues with a luxury tax. I investigate whether
the implementation of the luxury tax in 2003 positively affected competitive balance in the NBA.
Additionally, because the luxury tax was implemented in 2003 and reconstructed in 2013, I
establish three eras of the luxury tax: pre-luxury tax (1998–2002), original luxury tax (2003–
2012), and new luxury tax (2013–2016), and determine which era produced the most
competitively balanced NBA.I create a model that estimates competitive balance from 1998 to
2016 by using luxury tax and league level production data.
My findings provide evidence that since the implementation of the luxury tax in 2003,
competitive balance has improved in the NBA. Specifically, from 2003 to 2012, competitive
balance significantly improved from the 1998 to 2002 seasons in two of the three competitive
balance measures that I analyze. Additionally, I find that the more teams pay in luxury tax, the
worse competitive balance becomes, suggesting that as teams stockpile more talent, the league
becomes competitively imbalanced as a result.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 will discuss the background
and relevance of the luxury tax in the NBA. Section 3 is an in-depth review of literature on
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competitive balance and the validity of a luxury tax. Section 4 describes the data I use, while
section 5 details the model I created to measure the affect of the luxury tax on competitive
balance in the NBA. Section 6 interprets the results and section 7 discusses policy implications,
errors in my research, and pathways for future research on this topic.

2

Background
As polarizing and exciting as the NBA can be, it has been criticized for being the least

competitive of the four major sports in North America (Kilgore, 2017). More often than in
football, baseball, and hockey, basketball fans and professional analysts seem to think that
season outcomes are somewhat predictable because of the lack of competitive balance in the
NBA. In other words, the league is so bottom heavy that only a few teams have a legitimate
chance of winning the championship at the end of the season. For example: in the last 18 NBA
seasons, only 8 out of the 30 NBA teams have won the championship, which means a small
number of teams consistently contend for the NBA title, while the other 22 seem to never be
competitive (Basketball Reference, 2017). In order to combat competitive balance issues, in the
1999 Collective Bargaining Agreement, the NBA Player’s Association and owners agreed on
implementing multiple policies including the luxury tax. The luxury tax is a penalty mechanism
that taxes teams for exceeding the maximum team salary cap and redistributes that money to
non-offenders. By doing so, the NBA is incentivizing teams not to over-spend on player talent
which they hope will evenly distribute talent throughout the 30 teams.
As a result of the past collective bargaining agreements, the NBA has created and
implemented several policies to attempt to improve competitive balance. This review focuses on
the luxury tax because there is a lack of literature on how it could affect competitive balance in
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professional sports. The luxury tax is a mechanism that controls team spending (Coon, 2017). It
is a tax that the league imposes on teams who exceed the salary cap, which is a maximum
amount of money a franchise can spend on player salaries. Therefore, the luxury tax is
essentially an extension of the salary cap. The NBA salary cap is unique in that it is a soft cap in
which teams can exceed the predetermined amount that teams are allowed to spend on player
salaries. The punishment for exceeding the soft cap is the luxury tax. In contrast, the NFL and
NHL have a hard cap which is a non-negotiable maximum amount of money to spend on player
salaries (Leeds, 2016). Additionally, the MLB has no salary cap but rather just a luxury tax that
penalizes teams for spending over the set threshold.
With regards to competitive balance, the NFL, NHL, and MLB are recognized as more
balanced leagues than the NBA. This can be proven by looking at the ratio of standard deviation
of winning percentage to the ideal standard deviation in the league. Standard deviation of
winning percentage is heavily skewed based on the number of games in a season, so the ideal
standard deviation takes that into account. Because each team has a 0.5 probability to win a
game, the ideal standard deviation can be calculated by:
Ideal Standard Deviation of Winning Percentage =

0.5
√𝐺

where G is the number of games in a season. The closer the actual standard deviation of winning
percentage is to the ideal, the more competitively balanced a league is. Table 1 presents the
actual, ideal, and ratio of standard deviation of winning percentages in 2011 for the four major
sports in North America. It is no surprise that the NHL and NFL are the most competitively
balanced leagues because they are the only leagues with a hard salary cap. Based on the ratio, the
NBA is the least competitively balanced league.
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Table 1: Dispersion of Winning Percentages 2011 (Leeds, 2016)
League
NHL
NFL
MLB
NBA

Actual
Ideal
Ratio
0.080
0.056
1.43
0.201
0.125
1.61
0.069
0.039
1.77
0.158
0.056
2.82
There are many factors that could have led to the NBA becoming the least competitively

balanced league, but the structure of the soft salary cap may be a driving force. It is clear that the
NBA does not want to inhibit a team’s ability to stack talent based on their salary cap policies. In
addition to the soft cap, there are three contract exceptions that allow teams to further exceed the
salary cap with no penalty: Rookie, Midlevel, and Larry Bird Exceptions. The Rookie Exception
allows a team to sign a rookie to his first contract even if it puts the team over the cap (Leeds,
2016). The Midlevel Exception allows a team to sign one player to the average NBA salary when
the team is over the cap (Leeds, 2016). Lastly, the Larry Bird Exception allows teams to re-sign
players who were already on their roster even if the team is over the cap (Leeds, 2016). An
example of a team utilizing the opportunity to sign extra talent without exceeding the luxury tax
is the 2018 Houston Rockets. The Rockets were competing for a championship and were already
at the $99 million salary cap threshold, but wanted to add more talent in order to compete with
the Golden State Warriors. They were able to sign veteran PJ Tucker to a Mid Level
Exceptioncontract of $7.5 million without being penalized (Mahoney, 2017). Otherwise if the
three exception slots are filled and the team is over the soft cap, they are taxed. The luxury tax
forces teams to pay an increasing tax rate for every additional $5 million they are over the cap
(Coon, 2017) (Table 1).
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Table 2: The increasing luxury tax rate that teams must pay for exceeding the soft salary
cap in the NBA (Coon, 2017)

For example, if a team is $8 million over the salary cap, they would pay $5 million plus the tax
rate of 1.5, and an additional $3 million plus the tax rate of 1.75. So in total, a team over the
salary cap by $8 million will pay $12.75 million. Once all the luxury tax money is collected by
the league office, 50 percent is redistributed to teams who did not exceed the salary, which gives
teams incentives to not over spend, while the other 50 percent is used for “league purposes”
(Coon, 2017). Additionally, the NBA created a repeat offender clause to the luxury tax that raises
the tax rate for perennial over spenders, thus further incentivizing teams to not over spend. No
team has ever paid the “repeat offender” tax because it was implemented in 2013 (Coon, 2017).
In theory, the luxury tax could be an effective way to stop owners from overspending on
player talent and going over the cap, but in the end, it might not be the most effective method.
The problem that arises from a luxury tax is the distinction between two types of owners: profit
and win maximizers. If an owner believes wins are more important than profit, then the luxury
tax might not make a difference to them and they would be willing to pay the tax anyway. Team
owners have so much money that if the difference between winning and losing is paying an extra
$12.5 million for a talented player, then win maximizing owners will always invest in extra
talent. This is especially problematic because spending over the salary cap in order to sing extra
talent has proven to be a successful method to win more games. Table 3 shows that since 2003,
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teams that pay the luxury tax in a given year have significantly higher winning percentages
compared to seasons when they do not pay the luxury tax (p<0.05). Additionally, since 2003
eleven out of the 14 NBA champions (79%) paid some amount of luxury tax the year they won
the championship (Basketball Reference, 2017).
Table 3: Average winning percentage for teams when they pay luxury tax and when they do not.
(*=p<0.05)

Atlanta
Boston
Brooklyn/ NJ
Charlotte
Chicago
Cleveland
Dallas
Denver
Detroit
Golden State
Houston
Indiana
LA Clippers
LA Lakers
Memphis/VAN
Miami
Milwaukee
Minnesota
New Orleans
New York
Oklahoma City/
SEA
Orlando
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Portland
Sacramento
San Antonio

Paying
Not Paying
Luxury Tax Luxury Tax
0.52
0.47
0.63
0.45
0.55
0.40
n/a
0.44
0.53
0.48
0.69
0.41
0.68
0.52
0.60
0.46
0.66
0.50
0.89
0.43
0.51
0.55
0.59
0.54
0.68
0.38
0.63
0.57
0.47
0.43
0.60
0.56
0.51
0.45
0.57
0.40
n/a
0.47
0.40
0.51
0.61
0.60
0.50
0.61
0.59
0.70
0.73

0.54
0.48
0.44
0.54
0.54
0.43
0.70
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Toronto
Utah
Washington

League Average

0.35
0.57

0.47
0.56
0.41

0.59*

0.48

n/a

Charlotte, New Orleans, and Washington have never paid luxury tax.
*=p<0.05

This creates a problem for profit maximizing owners as the luxury tax could impede them from
signing extra talent in fear of paying the luxury tax. As a result, in an effort to improve
competitive balance, the luxury tax could in theory give win maximizing owners an even greater
advantage than they had before. Based on these theories, the effectiveness of a salary cap and
luxury tax has been heavily covered by sports economists.

3

Literature Review
The goal of this section is to examine the potential effectiveness of combating

competitive balance issues with a luxury tax by using evidence from past literature and sports
economic theories. The review will consist of four sections: the history of competitive balance,
measures of competitive balance, theories behind the NBA’s lack of competitiveness, and a
discussion onthe current landscape of salary cap.

3.1

Historyof Competitive Balance
This section will offer a history of the discourse on competitive balance and its

significance in professional sports. In most industries, competing firms try to maximize profits
and outlast competitors so they can gain a larger share of the market. Hypothetically,if a firm
outperforms the competition, they can increase market power, raise prices, and earn more profit.
In contrast, this is not the case in professional sports. Competing sports teams rely on the
economic success of their rivals because a more profitable league as a whole translates to more
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revenue for individual teams. This meansthat a league can be more profitable if the majority of
the teams are successful rather than just a few. Additionally, it isin the best interest of an
individual city for their team to be prosperous as Davis(2010) found that a successful NFL
franchise can raise a city’s real per capita personal income by enhancing productivity in the
workplace. Although his findings may be controversial as the relationship between team success
and real per capita personal income could be correlation and not causation, it does raise the idea
that a team’s success on the court could improve the well being of an entire city.
Not only does economic competitive balance help the league overall, but competitive
balance on the playing field is just as important. The reason why fans watch sports is because
they like watching an event in which the outcome is unknown. This desire for competition is
called the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis (Leeds, 2016). Essentially, the theory states that
fans will buy tickets or watch games on television more frequently if the outcome of a game is
not obvious (Leeds, 2016).Because of this phenomenon, there have been several economic
studies on how to measure competitive balance and why it is important for a league’s overall
success.
The first study on competitive balance was conducted by Rottenberg (1956) as he
discussed many new concepts involving the economics of professional sports. He stated, “The
nature of the industry is such that competitors must be of approximately equal ‘size’ if any are to
be successful. This seems to be a unique attribute of professional competitive sports.” He was the
first to suggest that not only is professional sports a unique industry, but also that leagues need to
be competitive to succeed. Additionally, El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) created the first model
considering competitive balance and found that less competitive leagues have lower fan
attendance overall. In their model, they derived gate receipts as a function of the stock of player
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talent on teams, the amount of player talent purchased through free agency, the amount of player
talent acquired through the draft, the wages of existing players on the roster, and the added costs
of signing players via draft and free agency. The shortcoming of their model comes in the
definition of player talent. The authors assumed that a player being added to an existing roster
will increase the overall talent pool of the team, when in reality that may not be the case. The
authors failed to use efficiency statistics like batting average or on base percentage to evaluate
talent. With that in mind, the main takeaway from their study suggests that although it is in a
team’s best interest to be superior to the rest of the league, teams should avoid becoming “too”
superior because game attendance will drop as a result of a violation in the Uncertainty of
Outcome Hypothesis. An example of this phenomenon is when the New York Yankees won 8
World Series championships in a span of 12 years in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. When the
Yankees won in 1949, a total of 2.3 million people attended Yankees’ home games, while after
their 5th world series title in 1953, attendance dropped to 1.5 million (Baseball Reference, 2017).
As a result of utter dominance in their sport, game attendance plummeted because the fans knew
who was going to win.
In contrast toEl-Hodiri and Quirk’s (1971) results, Coates and Humphreys (2012)
questioned the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis and found evidence that suggested it is not an
uncertain outcome that fans want, but rather an increased chance that the home team wins.
Unlike El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), the authors take consumer decision making and loss aversion
into consideration because of their anticipation of the Prospect Theory: the idea that expected
losses are treated differently than expected gains. Essentially, the Prospect Theory suggests that
consumers are driven by the potential value of losses and gains rather than just the final outcome
of a situation. In other words, because people are generally loss averse, they value gains much
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higher than losses. In the context of sports, because fans are usually loss averse, they are more
likely to attend games that they perceive their team has a good chance of winning because the
utility gained if their team wins is much higher than the utility lost if their team loses. Therefore,
the authors believe fan attendance is driven by the individual fan’s evaluations of expected
gained or lost utility, rather than the uncertainty of the outcome of the game.
The assumption that the Prospect Theory had influence on consumer’s decision making
to attend games was a revolutionary idea. The main findings were that fans are more likely to
attend games in which the home team is predicted to win and less likely to attend closely
predicted games. This suggests that fans value a win from the home team over the thrill of
watching their team lose a close game. These results further imply the importance of competitive
balance because if there are only a few superior teams, the worst teams will rarely have a chance
to win home games, resulting in decreased attendance for several franchises.Regardless of
whether the Coates and Humphreys hypothesis using Prospect Theory or the Uncertainty of
Outcome Hypothesis is the main driving force for game attendance, both of their results suggest
that it is in a league's best interest to be competitively balanced.

3.2

Measures of Competitive Balance
In this section, the creation, evolution, and validity of different competitive balance

measurements will be discussed. Although it is clear that competitive balance is an important
factor in a thriving sports league, past literature has disagreed upon which measure of
competitive balance is most effective. The disagreement from contributing authors does not
necessarily stem from theories being flawed, but rather from the existence of a plethora of
feasible ways to measure competitive balance. Competitive balance can be investigated at
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theseason and championship level. For example, some believe that leagues are the most balanced
when every team has the same chance to win any given game, thusthe difference between the
winning percentages of the best and worst teams would be relatively small. Others believe that
the turnover of champions defines a competitively balanced league. An example of a
competitively balanced league at the championship level would be the NFL in the early 2010s
when from 2009 to 2016, eight different teams won the Super Bowl (Pro-Football Reference,
2017). In other words, there are several ways to measure competitive balance and one is not
necessarily better than another.
In order to describe the state of competitive balance in professional sports, Fort and Quirk
(1995) used the most common measure of competitive balance which is within season variation
measured by standard deviation of winning percentages. This measure shows how far from or
close to the league’s average a team's winning percentage is. If there are teams with large
standard deviations, then the league is not very competitive. This method has its limitations as it
is simplistic and may not capture the distribution of competitiveness within a league. Therefore,
Humphreys (2002) created his own measure that shows competitive balance between seasons.
Humphreys derives a new way to measure competitive balance called the Competitive Balance
Ratio(CBR). This variable differs from the traditional standard deviation approach as it observes
the variation of the win-loss ratio of teams over several seasons. Traditional competitive balance
measures failto capture changes in the relative standings of sports teams over time, and CBR is
considered a more accurate measure of parity in a league across seasons (Humphreys, 2002).This
measure is a useful tool because although it is effective to analyze how competitive a league is
based on one season’s results, evaluating several seasons could capture the bigger picture and
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truly define how competitive a league actually is. Humphreys (2002) derives CBR using five
equations:
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅𝑖 2
𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 −𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑇

𝜎𝑇,𝑖 = √∑𝑖 (

) (1)

𝑇

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅𝑖 2
𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 −0.500

𝜎𝑁,𝑖 = √∑𝑖 (

𝜎̅𝑇 =
∑𝑖 𝜎𝑇,𝑖

(4)

𝑇

∑𝑖 𝜎𝑇,𝑖
𝑁

𝑁

) (2)

𝜎̅𝑁 =

(3)
̅̅̅̅
𝜎

𝑇
CBR =̅̅̅̅
𝜎
𝑁

(5)
In equation 1, Tis defined as the difference betweenteami’s winning percentage in seasontand
the team’s average winning percentage over T seasons. This means the largerTbecomes, the
more a team’s fortunes change from year to year. In other words, if Twas 0 then the team’s
record would be the same every year. In equation 2, Nis a vector for within-season variation in
winning percentages measured by the standard deviation of the winning percentage in each
season across all teams in the league. Equations 4 and 5 translateteam-level values of Tand

Ninto league level data by summingTand Nvalues of all 30 teams and dividing by number
of teams for Tand by number of seasons for N.In equation 5, CBR is defined as a ratio of the
sum Tand the sum of N.
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Like all competitive balance measures, CBR has limitations. When examining variation
between seasons, the measure is meant to capture how a team’s performance varies over a time
period. The measure does just this, but there is no one standard against which to judge variation
between seasons. In other words, one team’s variation in winning percentage is not necessarily
better than that of another. It is impossible to say whether owners and fans care more about how
much their team’s winning percentage varies, or how the team’s position changes relative to
other teams. For example, a team could have large variation in winning from year to year by
winning the championship one year, and having the worst winning percentage the next year. On
the other hand, a team could be consistently performing at the same level and finish at the top of
the league without winning the championship in the end. Therefore, it is the owner’s and fan’s
personal perspective of which situation is preferable.
Dorian (2007) used the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure competitive
balance by counting the number of teams that won a championship in a given period of time.
HHI can be calculated using one simple equation:
𝑐

HHI = ∑𝑖 ( 𝑇𝑖 )

2

where the number of championships team i won in a given period (c1), is divided by the number
of years in that period (T) and squared.The HHI is a useful measure in determining the turnover
of champions in a given sport and was derived from Rottenberg’s (1956) analysis of counting the
amount of times an MLB team won the pennant. The issue with HHI is that the measure only
uses championship as a measuring stick for success and ignores other variables of success.
Additionally, it can be heavily influenced by the number of teams in a league. With this in
mind,Depken (1999) expanded upon HHI to create dHHI, a measure which controls for the
growing or shrinking number of teams within a league. dHHI also does not take championships
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into account because (Depken 1999) did not believe winning a championship was the only
measure of success in a league. dHHI can be written as:
4

1

2
dHHI = 𝑁2 𝐺2 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1[𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖 ] − 𝑁

where N is the number of teams in the league, and G is the numbers of games played in a season.
In summary, there is no right or wrong way to measure competitive balance as each
measure focuses on a different aspect of competitiveness in a league. Measurements of within
season variation, between season variation, and championship turnover rates are all valid ways in
describing competitive balance and can be effective in their own way. After having discussed the
history and evolution of competitive balance measures, the next section will be focused on
theories that attempt to explain why the NBA specifically is the least balanced major sport.

3.3

Competitive Balance in the NBA
In an effort to describe why competitive balance differs in major sports, Zimbalist (2002)

explains that distinctive fan pressure, technology, demographic, playing rules and field
conditions all affect a sport’s competitive balance differently. He essentially states that there may
be exogenous sport specific reasons that cause differences in competitive balance among
leagues. On that note, basketball is a unique sport that gives certain athletes advantages that may
not be seen in other sports. A natural competitive imbalance may be created because of this.
Berri et al (2005) rationalize that the reason competitive imbalance still persists in the NBA is
because of a short supply of tall people. In basketball, height gives an advantage not applicable
in other sports and players who are both tall and particularly talented are extremely rare. Teams
that can attainthese tall, talented players gaina competitive edge. This conclusion suggests that
no matter what policies the NBA creates to improve competitive balance, there will always be a
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degree of competitive imbalance because of the natural advantages the sport gives to a very
small population of players. Additionally, the rules of basketball may also give advantages to
teams that are not seen in other major sports. Rockerbie (2014) claims that the rules of basketball
give a considerable advantage to teams with more stacked talent. This is because there are more
scoring attemptsin basketball than in any other sport, which allows star players to have a bigger
impact on any given game. This makes sense because at any given time, there are only five
players on the court for each team, which means a star playernot only has the most time with the
ball, but they also have the greatest chance to score compared to other sports. Therefore, with the
combination of the most scoring attempts in any sport, and star players having the ability to
affect the game more dramatically, the rules of basketball give natural advantages to teams who
are able to stockpile talent. Rockerbie (2014) backs this claim byprovingthe NBA is indeed the
least competitive major sport by using a standard deviation measure for league parity. Clearly, if
a team has more talent they have a greater chance to win in any sport, but because of the high
amount of scoring opportunities in basketball, stars can have a much greater impact on individual
games. Therefore, the role of the luxury tax in the NBA is pertinent to mitigating how teams
stack talent and ultimately shift the competitive balance.

3.4

Salary Cap and Luxury Tax Models and Theories
This section will discuss how current literature views the introduction and validity of

both a salary cap and luxury tax. Kesenne (2000) created a “two-club” model and showed the
potential effect of the introduction of the salary cap in a large and small market team. He found
that overall competitive balance improved with the implementation of a salary cap because large
market teams would not be able to sign the most talented players and overall, player talent
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wouldbe more evenly distributed throughout the league. The author also found that profit
margins of small market and large market teams even out, as small market teams made a larger
profit as a result of a salary cap. Fort and Quirk (1995) found similar results as they discovered
large market teams have unfair advantages that create higher revenue streams in comparison to
small markets and can therefore spend more money on player salaries. They conclude that an
implementation of a salary cap would even the playing field so large firms could not spend more
on talent, thus improving competitive balance. Although both Kesenne (2000) and Fort and
Quirk (1995) come to the same conclusion, neither paper used data from an actual sports league
as they created completely theoretical models. Still, these papers are relevant concluding that an
introduction of a salary cap could improve competitive balance.
Giocoli (2007) is the first paper to account for whether an owner is a profit maximizer or
win maximizer and created a model that makes this distinction. He discovered that with the
assumption that only some owners are truly trying to win, parity is decreased in a league because
win maximizers simply win more. Therefore, he concluded that the addition of a salary cap
would impact the spending habits of win maximizers and improve overall competitive balance.
Unfortunately, because the paper is about a salary cap and not a luxury tax, it does not discuss
the potential increasing win gap between win and profit maximizing owners that might arise as
an outcome of a luxury tax.
Additionally, Hastings (2015) studied the effect of the maximum player salary
implemented in the 1999 CBA. The maximum player salary is essentially a salary cap on the
individual player level, where players of certain years of experience in the NBA cannot earn
more than a league defined threshold. He found that controlling for productivity and other factors
related to player salaries, the second and third best players on NBA rosters received more money
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as a result of the maximum player salary. This conclusion could have implications on
competitive balance as stars on talented teams will not want to make less money so they may
relocate through free agency and receive the money they think they deserve, thus balancing out
the talent dispersion in the NBA. Unfortunately, these results may not apply to the NBA
anymore as the league has recently implemented the Designated Veteran Player Extension rule
that allows players to make more money by signing back with their current team rather
thanswitching teams during free agency in an effort to combat the creation of “super teams”
(Windhorst, 2016). All in all, Kesenne (2000), Fort and Quirk (1995), Giocoli (2007), and
Hastings (2015) all agree that the implementation of a salary cap should have a positive impact
on competitive balance. Although, it is essential to discuss the validity of a salary cap,
ultimately, the goal of this paper it to examine the effectiveness of a luxury tax.
The past literature shows that in theory, the salary cap should be enough to improve
competitive balance in the NBA, but the league clearly thought it needed to continue to work on
the problem. It is easy for teams to exceed the soft cap especially with the three exceptions
unique to the NBA: Rookie, Midlevel, and Larry Bird Exceptions. Not only does the luxury tax
punish over spenders, but it incentivizes teams who are not over the cap. Dietl et al. (2010)
analyzed the effect of a luxury tax on competitive balance, club profits, and social welfare in a
closed sports league under the assumptions that supply of talent is elastic and clubs maximize
profits. The authors used a model similar to Kesenne’ (2000) two-club model in which they
analyzed a large and small market team with profit maximizing owners. Additionally, Dietl et
al’s. (2010) model differed from Berri et al’s. (2005) in that they assumed elasticity of supply of
player talent is different. The authors foundthat a luxury tax will produce a more balanced league
by incentivizing small market teams to increase player salaries and large market teams to
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decrease player salaries.Additionally, the results suggest that a more competitively balanced
league will increase social welfare as a result of a higher quality league in general. The problem
with Dietl et al’s. (2010) model is that it does not explore the impact of a win maximizing owner
which is particularly relevant in today’s NBA.
In contrast Kaplan (2004) finds different results fromthe implementation of a luxury tax,
and although he never mentioned win maximizing owners specifically, his results suggest that
the behavior that win maximizers display will give them an advantage in a luxury tax system.
Kaplan explored the implications of the NBA luxury tax model by identifying two “threats” to
teams that hurt the franchises competitively as a result of the luxury tax. These threats include an
inefficiency in the tax because of a lack of information due to escrow and penalty situations
being calculated in the post-season, and more importantly,an overall decline in competitive
balance because most teams will not sign extra talent due to fear of paying the tax. The idea that
some teams will not sign extra talent in order to not pay the luxury tax is in line with the
concepts explored in Giocoli (2007). If a luxury tax does indeed promote win maximizers to sign
additional talent over the cap and thwart profit maximizers to not sign talent to stay under the
cap, there could be detrimental consequences to a leagues overall competitive balance. It is
difficult to say whether Dietl’s or Kaplan’s prediction of the outcome of competitive balance is
true because there is not enough literature on the sole effect of the luxury tax in the NBA, so it is
clear that more research needs to be done.
The current literature on the validity of combating competitive balance issues with a
luxury tax is thin. Both Dietl et al. (2010) and Kaplan’s (2004) results are based off of theoretical
models and ideas but fail to utilize real data in their discussion of the luxury tax. This paper is the
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first to use NBA team and league level data in order to determine if the luxury tax has improved
competitive balance over time.

4

Data
This section will discuss the collection and utilization of data used in the OLS

regressions. This paper analyzes 19 NBA seasons from 1998 to 2016 and includes team and
league level data. All of the data were collected from Basketballreference.com, and Larry Coon’s
Salary Cap Faq website: cbafaq.com. Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the variables
pertinent to my analysis. Every variable has 19 observations except for ALLSTAR because the
all-star game was canceled in 1999 due to the lockout. The average standard deviation of
winning percentage across the 19 NBA seasons was 0.16 suggesting that 68% of NBA teams had
winning percentages between 0.34 and 0.66 during that span. Additionally, the large standard
deviation of LUXTOTAL was $138.25 million compared to a mean of $171.70 million because
of the simulated luxury tax values from 1998 to 2002. This will be further discussed in Section 6.
The description of the rest of the variables can be found in Section 5. Team level data of winning
percentages, luxury tax payments and talent measurements were collected for each of the 30
NBA teams and condensed into league level data.
Table 4: Summary Statistics
VARIABLES

Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

TEAMS

19

29.58

0.51

TALENT

19

0.67

0.02

dHHI

19

0.003

0.001

SDWP

19

0.16

0.15
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CBR

19

0.76

0.08

ALLSTAR

18

4.64

0.46

ALLNBA

19

6.91

0.53

LUXTOTAL

19

171.70

138.25

LUXDIS

19

46.94

18.95

4.1

Team Data
All of the productivity data at the team level was collected from Basketballreference.com.

The data collected includes: winning percentage, points scored, points allowed, number of all
stars, and number of All NBA team members. Using these data, I am able to construct the three
dependent variables of competitive balance including: standard deviation of winning percentage
(SDWP), dHHI, and CBR. I chose SDWP because it is the most basic and commonly used
variable to measure competitive balance. I also chose dHHI because it is generally a better
indicator of within season variation in competitive balance because of the intuitive flaws of
SDWP. Lastly, I chose to use CBR because both SDWP and dHHI only measure competitive
balance on a one-year scale while CBR measures competitive balance over several seasons.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 display these measures over time. Figures 1 and 2 show that the league was
more competitively balanced in the early 2000s and has gotten worse since. In contrast, Figure 3
shows the exact opposite as the league was competitively unbalanced in the early 2000s and has
since improved. The drastic increase in standard deviation of winning percentage and dHHI in
2008 could be explained by the NBAs entrance into the super team era. In 2008, all-stars Kevin
Garnett and Ray Allen were traded to the Boston Celtics and won a championship in their first
year (Stein, 2007). Their three-year dominance of the NBA led to the domino effect of all-stars
leaving their franchises in order to compete for championships including LeBron James in 2010.
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Figures 1 and 2 show competitive balance has since improved since 2009, but the super team

Standard Deviation of Winning
Percentage

era’s competitive balance is much worse than the previous five seasons.
0.20
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Year

Figure 1: Standard Deviation of Winning Percentage over 19 NBA seasons.
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Figure 2: dHHI over 19 NBA seasons
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Figure 3: Competitive Balance Ratio over 19 NBA seasons.
Additionally, all of the luxury tax data for individual teams were retrieved from Larry
Coon’s Salary Cap Faq website: cbafaq.com. This included the single season amount of luxury
tax paid per season, and the total amount of luxury tax paid by every NBA franchise from 2003
to 2016. These data were used to create independent variables of total luxury tax payments and
distribution of luxury tax payments in order to attempt to explain the competitive balance
measures. The total amount of luxury tax paid by each franchise can be seen in Figure 4. It is
clear that most of the league’s franchises pay close to the same amount of taxes while a few
franchises pay a significantly more. The teams that pay the highest amount of luxury taxes tend
to either be in a big market, for example New York and Los Angeles, or have a win maximizing
owner like Mark Cuban from the Dallas Mavericks. As seen in Table 3, paying more luxury tax
generally is correlated with a higher winning percentage as the Dallas Mavericks win 0.52% of
their games without paying the luxury tax and 0.68% of their games while paying the luxury tax.
Unfortunately for the New York Knicks, this is not always the case. New York has paid the most
luxury tax in the NBA but actually has a lower winning percentage when they pay the tax
compared to when they do not. This rare circumstance is most likely caused by poor ownership,
managing, and coaching decisions.
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Figure 4: Total amount of luxury tax payments by every NBA team from 2003 to 2016

4.2

League Data
The league level data was created by condensing all of the team level data into one

number per year. For example: each team in a given year has its own dHHI value, so in order to
get a league wide measure for dHHI, the individual measures of each of the 30 NBA teams are
summed into one number. The league level luxury tax data are presented in Figures 5 and 6.
Figure 5 shows the total amount of luxury tax paid by all 30 NBA teams from 1998-2016 and
Figure 6 shows the percent of teams that paid the luxury tax in every season. Although it is true
the luxury tax was introduced in 2003, in this analysis I make the assumption that in the seasons
from 1998-2002, any dollar above the salary cap in a given season would have been luxury tax
payments. In this assumption I use the luxury tax policy from 2003 to 2012 in which $1 over the
salary cap equates to $1 in luxury tax payment. For example: in 1998 the salary cap was set at
$26.9 million. In that season the New York Knicks paid $53.9 million for player salaries, so in
my analysis I would have the Knicks paying $27 million in luxury tax. Unfortunately, I was not
able to find data on which players signed Rookie, Midlevel, and Larry Bird exceptions for the
1998 to 2002 seasons, so the luxury tax values may be too high.
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In addition to the three dependent variables of competitive balance previously mentioned,
I calculated HHI which is the dispersion of championships won in a given period of time. HHI is
presented in Table 5 and calculated in accordance to the three eras of the luxury tax, which will
be further explained in Section 5. The NBA is more competitively balanced when HHI is lower
because a variety of teams are winning the championship in a given period of time rather than
just a few. HHI is lower in the seasons following the implementation of the luxury tax suggesting
the NBA is more competitively balanced. The reason why HHI from 1998 to 2002 is almost
double the two other eras, is because the Los Angeles Lakers won three out of the five
championships in that time period, while in the following 15 years, eight different teams won the
NBA championship (Springer, 2002).
Table 5:HHI in the NBA over the three eras of luxury tax
Seasons
1998-2002
2003-2012
20013-2016

HHI
0.44
0.2
0.25

500
400
300
200
100
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Figure 5: Sum of luxury tax payments made by NBA teams over 19 seasons
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Figure 6: Percent of NBA teams that paid the luxury tax over 19 NBA seasons.
#The luxury tax was implemented in 2003 so before 2003, NBA teams did not pay luxury tax but the bar graph
representssimulated luxury tax in that given year.

5

Model
This section describes the model used in this paper along with a description of variables

used in the regressions.The regression I use is similar to the methodology used in Larsen et al.
(2006) as well as Couture (2016). Both Larsen et al. (2006) and Couture (2016) use the same
TALENT measure that I do, while Couture (2016) also analyses SDWP and dHHI. I have added
several independent variables and one dependent variable to my model in order to attempt to
predict competitive balance more accurately. I use three equations in my regression at the league
level:

SDWP = 0 + 1TEAMSt + 2TALENTt + 3ALLSTARt + 4ALLNBAt
5LUXTOTt + 6LUXDISt + 7ERA98 + 8ERA03 + 9ERA13 + t

(1)

dHHI = 0 + 1TEAMSt + 2TALENTt + 3ALLSTARt + 4ALLNBAt
5LUXTOTt + 6LUXDISt + 7ERA98 + 8ERA03 + 9tERA13 + t

(2)
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CBR = 0 + 1TEAMSt + 2TALENTt + 3ALLSTARt + 4ALLNBAt
5LUXTOTt + 6LUXDISt + 7ERA98 + 8ERA03 + 9ERA13 + t

(3)

Where:

SDWP

The league wide standard deviation of winning percentage in a given year.

dHHI

A single season measure of competitive balance

CBR

A measure of competitive balance over several seasons

TEAMS
TALENT
ALLSTAR
ALLNBA

The number of teams in the NBA in a given season.
A measure of player talent.
A measure of team talent defined by the distribution of all stars per team.
A measure of team talent defined by the distribution of post-season All
NBA award winners per team.

LUXTOT
LUXDIS

The total amount of luxury tax paid by NBA teams in a given year.
The dispersion of luxury tax payments between NBA teams in a
given year

ERA98

1 if the seasons were from 1998 to 2002, 0 if otherwise

ERA03

1 if the seasons were from 2003 to 2012, 0 if otherwise

ERA13

1 if the seasons were from 2013 to 2016, 0 if otherwise

The primary goal of this paper is to analyze if the introduction of a luxury tax affected
competitive balance in the NBA. In order to fully investigate that inquiry, I looked at the
dispersion of talent in the NBA to see if that affected competitive balance in any way. The first
measure of talent is taken from Larsen (2006). It is a broad assumption of talent, but is designed
to take into account the quality of the players, coaching staff, training staff and front office, and
is defined as:
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TALENT = HHIPF + HHIPA
Where HHIPF, the measure of offensive talent, is defined as:
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑

2

𝑖
HHIPPFt= ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 )

and HHIPA, the measure of defensive talent is defined as:
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑

𝑖
HHIPPAt = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 )

2

This measure of talent attempts to capture both the offensive and defensive talent of a team by
calculating where a team ranks among points scored and points allowed in a given season
compared to the rest of the NBA. Although this measure is able to capture some of the talent on
an NBA team, it is too broad and may not fully capture how much talent is on a given NBA
roster. In order to combat this, I created the measures ALLSTAR and ALLNBA to capture the
true dispersion of talent in the NBA which are similar to standard deviation measures. In the
NBA, an “all star” is usually the best player on a team and is voted in by fans to play in the
annual all star game. These elite group of players perform at a much higher level than the
average NBA player and because of that have a greater impact on games. Depending on injuries
or other factors that would lead to a player getting replaced in the all star game, there are 24 total
players selected to the all star team. A perfectly competitive league may have 1 all star from 12
teams in the Eastern Conference, and 12 teams in the Western Conference but that is not always
the case. For example: in 2011 the Boston Celtics had four players selected from their team to
play in the all star game while 14 different teams had zero all stars selected. The ALLSTAR
variable is defined as:
√∑ 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖 − (

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 2
)
𝑁
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where All Stars is the number of all-stars on team i, Total All Stars is the total amount of all-stars
in the NBA, and N is the number of teams in a given year.
For the same reasons that the TALENT measure may not capture a team’s total amount
of talent, the ALLSTAR variable is not enough to capture how much talent is on a given team.
The last Talent measure ALLNBA is similar to ALLSTAR. At the end of the NBA season, the
15 best offensive and 10 best defensive players are placed on an “all-NBA team”. The five best
players are awarded to the first team All-NBA, the next five best players are awarded to the
second team All-NBA, and the next five best players are awarded to the third team All-NBA.
The same process is done for ALL-NBA defensive teams, and ALL-NBA teams are a great
indicator of how much talent is or is not stacked on a roster. In order to be considered for the
ALLNBA variable, a player must have won the Most Valuable Player award, the Defensive
Player of the Year award, or been placed on the first, second, or third all offensive or defensive
NBA teams. This adds up to 27 possible slots to be filled by players every year. Uniquely for this
variable, one player could “earn” more than one of the 27 possible All NBA slots in this analysis.
For example: in 2012 LeBron James won the MVP award and was placed on both 1st team allNBA and 1st team all-defense, which would amount three points for the Miami Heat in ALLNBA
(Basketball Reference, 2017). The ALLNBA variable is defined as:
√∑ 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝐵𝐴𝑖 − (

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝐵𝐴 2
)
𝑁

Where All NBA is the number of All NBA players on team i, Total ALL NBA is the total number
of ALL-NBA players in the NBA, and N is the number of teams.
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Lastly, the three ERA variables are meant to capture the three eras of the luxury tax in the
NBA. This paper examines NBA season from 1998 to 2016. ERA98 examines the seasons from
1998 to 2002 because the luxury tax was implemented in 2003 and this era acts a control or
comparison group. From 2003 to 2012 a luxury tax was implemented, but the tax was set up so
that a team over the salary cap paid $1 in luxury tax for every $1 they were over the cap.
However, in 2013 the luxury tax policy changed so into an increasing tax rate to try to stop teams
from over spending as seen in 2.
I would expect the coefficient for TEAM, TALENT, ALLSTAR, and ALLNBA to all be
positive because the more concentrated talent is on a given team, the less competitively balanced
the league will be. I hypothesize this based on the results of (Rockerbie, 2014) that suggested
stars in the NBA have greater impacts on individual games more than any other sport. Therefore,
asthe TALENT, ALLSTAR, and ALLNBA measures become higher, competitive balance
declines.Additionally, I would expect LUXTOT and LUXDIS to be positive. The more luxury
tax money spent, the more teams are attempting to stack talent and increase their winning
percentage.This is based on the findings displayed in Table 3 that show in most cases, winning
percentages of teams increase when they pay the luxury tax. Similar to the variables that measure
the dispersion of talent, competitive balance should decrease if the luxury tax is dispersed
unevenly. For example, if only two teams pay a high amount of luxury tax in one season, then
LUXDIS will be high and competitive balance should be lower compared to a season where
every team is paying the luxury tax. Lastly, I expect the ERA03 and ERA13 to be negative
because they are dummy variables being compared to ERA98 and I predict competitive balance
will be improved after 2003. I hypothesize that in the years after the luxury was implemented in
the NBA, competitive balance will improve simply because I believe the luxury tax is an
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effective way to improve competitive balance. This hypothesis also matches the results from
Dietl et al.(2010) that found the implementation of a luxury tax will produce a more balanced
league.
In this analysis I run two separate regressions. The first having the assumption of
simulated luxury tax for the 1998 to 2002 seasons. As mentioned earlier, this assumption
calculates what teams would be paying in luxury tax if it had been established in those seasons.
This will be regression one. Regression two will assume zero luxury tax payments until the 2003
NBA season.

6

Results

6.1

Simulated Luxury Tax
The results from regression one are presented in Table 6. The only statistically significant

finding was the effect of ERA03 on dHHI (p<0.1), but the signs and magnitudes of the other
coefficients might suggest trends in competitive balance. Because the three ERA variables are
dummies, ERA03 and ERA13 are being compared to ERA98. Thus, the significance and
negativity of ERA03 in equation 2 means that competitive balance was significantly improved in
the 2003 to 2012 seasons compared to the 1998 to 2002 seasons. Additionally, the signs of the
coefficients for equation 1 and 2 are identical suggesting that SDWP and dHHI are similarly
affected by the independent variables, although their scales and interpretations are different. On
the other hand, the coefficients for TALENT, ALLSTAR, LUXDIS, ERA03, and ERA13 in
equation 3 were different from equations 1 and 2 (Table 6). A negative coefficient in this
regression means the independent variable positively affects or improves competitive balance.
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VARIABLES

Table 6: Regression OneResults
(1)
(2)
SDWP
dHHI

(3)
CBR

TEAMS

-0.00527
(0.0204)

-0.000238
(0.000812)

-0.0840
(0.0855)

TALENT

-5.347
(4.842)

-0.232
(0.192)

21.63
(20.24)

ALLSTAR

0.00534
(0.0119)

0.000160
(0.000473)

-0.0286
(0.0498)

ALLNBA

0.01000
(0.00996)

0.000385
(0.000396)

0.0119
(0.0417)

LUXTOTAL

-4.25e-05
(6.18e-05)

-2.12e-06
(2.45e-06)

-2.07e-06
(0.000258)

LUXDIS

0.000151
(0.000358)

7.01e-06
(1.42e-05)

-0.000336
(0.00150)

ERA03

-0.0252
(0.0145)

-0.00119*
(0.000576)

0.0712
(0.0606)

ERA13

-0.0230
(0.0212)

-0.00108
(0.000841)

0.151
(0.0885)

Constant

0.597
(0.913)

0.0234
(0.0362)

1.792
(3.814)

Observations
R-squared

18
18
0.443
0.471
se in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

18
0.648
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I will first discuss the results for SDWP and dHHI because they have identical coefficient
signs, and discuss CBR after for each variable.Surprisingly all three equations produced a
negative coefficient for the total amount of luxury tax payments. This result suggests that the
more luxury tax being paid at the league level, the more competitively balanced the league
becomes. For every one-dollar increase in luxury tax payments, competitive balance increases by
4.25e-05, 2.12e-06, and 2.07e-06 for SDWP, dHHI and CBR respectively. Although the results
provide a different conclusion from my hypothesis, there are a couple theories that could explain
this. First, I assumed that the more luxury taxes being paid equated to more talent being stacked.
Although this could be true, the dispersion of luxury tax will define if the league is more
competitive or not. In other words, even if the total amount of luxury tax paid is increasing every
year, as long as the dispersion of payments stays constant between the teams, then talent is being
stacked somewhat evenly. Another possibility is my assumption of luxury tax payments before
2003 may have skewed the data. For example: in this regression, the average amount of assumed
luxury tax paid per year before 2003 was $338 million while the average amount of luxury tax
paid per year after 2003 was $94.6 million. This is a stark difference which shows the potential
of skewed data. All in all, the assumption of pre-2003 luxury tax may not be an accurate
representation as it does not take contract exceptions into account for any of the 29 NBA teams.
As mentioned above, the distribution of luxury tax payments may be a better indicator of
competitive balance than just the total amount of luxury tax paid. Equations 1 and 2, as expected,
produce a positive coefficient suggesting the more evenly distributed the luxury tax payments are
between the 30 NBA teams, the more competitive balance improves. Equation 3 on the other
hand produces a negative coefficient. The regression suggests a one-unit increase in luxury tax
dispersion increases SDWP by 0.0000151 and dHHI by 7.01e-06, and decreases CBR by
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0.000336. Again, none of the LUXDIS coefficients are statistically significant but the
distribution of tax payments could have been skewed by the assumptions made for regression
one.
The measure for concentration of talent is insignificant and unexpectedly negative in
equations 1 and 2. A one-unit increase in talent dispersion increases SDWP by 5.347 and dHHI
by 0.232. The regression suggests that as the concentration of talent increases, competitive
balance improves. In other words, if a few teams have more stacked talent than the rest of the
league, competitive balance is improved. On the other hand, equation 3 suggests the opposite as
a one-unit increase in talent dispersion increases CBR by 21.63. This implies that as the
concentration of talent decreases, the more competitive balance improves which intuitively
makes more sense.
As expected, the coefficients of dispersion of all-stars and All-NBA players are positive
in equations 1 and 2. A one-unit increase in all-star dispersion increases SDWP by 0.00534and
dHHI by 0.000160, while a one-unit increase in All-NBA dispersion increases SDWP by0.01000
and dHHI by 0.000385. This suggests the more dispersed all-stars and All-NBA players are
throughout the league, the more competitively balanced the league becomes. On the other hand,
equation 3 produced a negative coefficient for all star dispersion but none of the variables were
significant.
Additionally, equation 1 and 2 suggest that as the number of teams increases, competitive
balance improves, although this coefficient is insignificant. This can be seen in Figure 1 and 2
when a 30th team was added to the NBA in 2003, both SDWP and dHHI slightly decreased until
2007 thus improving competitive balance. CBR displayed a positive coefficient even though
Figure 3 shows competitive balance increasing after 2003. Intuitively, an argument could be
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madeto either improve or worsen competitive balance with an addition of a new team. When a
new team is added to the NBA, they take part in an expansion draft in which the new team picks
designated players from the other NBA teams. This could improve competitive balance if the
players chosen are talented and work well together, thus making the expansion team competitive.
On the other hand, if the players chosen do not have good chemistry on the court, they will be a
losing team, thus making the league less competitive. Additionally, according to Berri et al.
(2005), there is a short supply of tall players in the NBA, specifically tall players that are talented
as well. If a new team is added to the league, talent could be dispersed too thin and create a noncompetitive team.
The last variables in regression one are the two time dummy variables comparing ERA03
and ERA13 to ERA98. Like most of the results, equations 1 and 2 have differing signs of
coefficients than equation 3. Both ERA03 and ERA13 are negative suggesting that competitive
balanced has improved since the 1998 to 2002 seasons. In equation 2, ERA03 supplies the only
statistically significant finding in regression one, further suggesting that ERA98 was the least
competitively balanced ERA being analyzed. With regards to equation 3, CBR does not
necessarily measure competitive balance on a year to year basis but rather how team’s
performance differs over time. Therefore, the positive coefficient for both ERA03 and ERA13
may suggest that team performance varies more often than in ERA98.

6.2

Non-simulated Luxury Tax Payments
The results from regression two are presented in Table 7. Regression two uses the same

three equations as regression one but does not assume any luxury tax payments before the 2003
NBA season. Therefore, in this regression, all luxury tax payments before 2003 are considered to
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be 0. As a result, in comparison to regression one, there is much more statistical significance
found in the results of regression two. There was no significance found in equation 3, but
TALENT, LUXTOTAL, and ERA03 were significant in equation1 while TALENT,
LUXTOTAL, ERA03, and ERA13 were significant in equation 2.

VARIABLES

Table 7: Regression TwoResults
(1)
(2)
SDWP
dHHI

(3)
CBR

TEAMS

0.00245
(0.0114)

0.000140
(0.000454)

-0.0692
(0.0559)

TALENT

-6.891*
(3.610)

-0.283*
(0.144)

17.71
(17.67)

ALLSTAR

0.0119
(0.00959)

0.000455
(0.000381)

-0.0129
(0.0470)

ALLNBA

0.0101
(0.00854)

0.000409
(0.000340)

0.0221
(0.0418)

LUXTOTAL

0.000330*
(0.000166)

1.32e-05*
(6.62e-06)

0.000598
(0.000814)

LUXDIS

-0.000387
(0.000401)

-1.41e-05
(1.60e-05)

-0.000635
(0.00196)

ERA03

-0.0457**
(0.0162)

-0.00202**
(0.000646)

0.0219
(0.0796)

ERA13

-0.0387
(0.0212)

-0.00175*
(0.000844)

0.0929
(0.104)

Constant

0.445
(0.502)

0.0143
(0.0200)

1.478
(2.458)

Observations
R-squared

18
18
0.621
0.639
se in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

18
0.672
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Not surprisingly, regression two produced completely different results with regards to the
impact of total luxury tax payments in the league. Not only did the signs change in all three
equations from negative to positive, but there was significance found in equations 1 and 2. For
every one-dollar increase in luxury tax payments, competitive balance increases by0.000330,
1.32e-05, and0.000598 for SDWP, dHHI and CBR respectively.The positive coefficient suggests
as the total amount of luxury taxes being paid increases, competitive balance decreases. These
results suggest that the total amount of luxury tax paid had significant impacts on both SDWP
and dHHI. This affirms my original hypothesis that the more teams spend in the luxury tax, the
more talent is being stacked around the league and thus the less competitively balanced the
league becomes. Additionally, the dispersion of luxury tax payments between teams again was
not significant but the signs did change from positive to negative in regression two. The
regression suggests that a one-unit increase in luxury tax dispersion decreases SDWP
by0.000387,dHHI by 1.41e-05, and CBR by 0.000635. The negative signs suggest, as the luxury
tax payments are more equally dispersed between the 30 NBA teams, the more competitively
balanced the league becomes.
In comparison to regression one, the dummy time variable’s coefficients stayed
consistent in all three equations but gained significance in regression two. There was no
significance found in equation 3 but ERA03 was significant in both equation 1 and 2 while
ERA13 was only significant in equation 1. The negative coefficient of ERA 03 coupled with
significance in both equations 1 and 2 suggest that competitive balance significantly improved in
comparison to ERA98. The same could be said with equation 2 and ERA13. As mentioned
above, CBR measures how a team’s performance differs over time. The coefficient may be
positive because team’s performances may have varied less in ERA98 than in ERA03 and
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ERA13. Overall with the significant improvement in the eras following the 1998 to 2002 seasons
it seems that Dietl et al’s. (2010) prediction of improved competitive balance after the
implementation of a luxury tax was correct.
The dispersion of all-stars between NBA teams did not change signs or significance from
regression one to regression two. The coefficients were positive for equations 1 and 2, and
negative for equation 3. The regression suggests a one-unit increase in all star dispersion
decreases SDWP by 0.0119 and dHHI by0.000455, and decreases CBR by 0.0129.As mentioned
before, the positive coefficient for ALLSTAR suggests that as dispersion of all stars decreases
amongst the teams, competitive balance worsens. Additionally, in comparison of regression one
to regression two, the coefficients and significance of ALLNBA did not change in all three
equations.
The coefficients for the number of teams in the NBA switched from negative to positive
in equations 1 and 2, suggesting that as more teams join the NBA, the league’s competitive
balance worsens. With regards to the concentration of talent in the league, none of the
coefficients changed signs within the three equations, but TALENT became significant in
equations 1 and 2. That means that the concentration of talent significantly decreases SDWP and
dHHI thus improving competitive balance.

7

Discussion
The goal of this paper was to determine if the NBA luxury tax had improved competitive

balance since its implementation in 2003. There is a large gap in luxury tax research as no paper
has used NBA data to analyze the impact of the luxury tax on competitive balance. To this date,
only theoretical models and analysis of the NBA luxury tax have been examined. For that reason,
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this investigation and analysis of the NBA luxury tax has made a significant contribution to
sports economic literature. Regression one with a simulated luxury tax from 1998 to 2002 had
significantly different results from regression two which set luxury tax payments before 2003 at
zero. Based on the results of regression two, the total amount of luxury tax payments made by all
teams in a given year, had a significant effect on both standard deviation of winning percentage
and dHHI. Additionally, the seasons from 2003 to 2012 when the luxury tax was first
implemented, had significantly lower standard deviation of winning percentages and dHHI
compared to the seasons with no luxury tax penalty. The differences in significance from
regression one to regression two suggest that with the introduction of a luxury tax, talent became
more expensive. Before the luxury tax, teams could exceed the salary cap and stack as much
talent as they wanted with no penalty mechanism in place, but the luxury tax made talent costlier.
Therefore, a team wanting to sign an all-star, free-agent in order to compete for a championship
in 2010 would be more expensive compared to 2000. For this reason, competitive balance was
significantly improved after the implementation of the luxury tax because NBA teams who were
over the salary cap would chose not to sign extra talent, therefore dispersing talent to a team who
is comfortably under the salary cap.
To clarify, the implementation of the luxury tax is not the sole reason for improved
competitive balance in the NBA. Other policies like free agency, revenue sharing, and the
reverse-order entry draft could have also improved competitive balance over time.Although the
luxury tax cannot take full credit for the improvement in competitive balance, it is certainly part
of the reason for improvements.
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7.1

Policy Implications
It is clear that the luxury tax has helped in improving competitive balance in the NBA

over the last 13 seasons. Although true in most economics of sports studies, the increased tax
bracket component of the luxury tax was only implemented in 2013, making the sample size of
this study too small. Therefore, the regressions may not have been able to capture its true effects.
As a result, it is difficult to say which luxury tax policy was more effective in improving
competitive balance. With that being said, the results of this analysis suggest the luxury tax has
improved competitive balance over time and should not be changed if the NBA is satisfied with
the current state of competitive balance. On the other hand, if the NBA league office was truly
concerned with the current state of competitive balance, they would follow suit of the NFL and
NHL and implement a hard salary cap which has been shown to improve competitive
balance.With the soft salary cap being such an integral part of how the NBA functions, it may be
difficult to simply shift the soft salary cap into a hard salary cap. Therefore, if the NBA feels
teams are still stacking talent too easily, they could consider removing the Rookie, Mid-level,
and Larry Bird contract exceptions that further allow teams to exceed the soft salary cap. This is
a more realistic and obtainable goal for the NBA in inhibiting a teams’ ability to stack talent.

7.2

Limitations of Research
It is worth noting the limitations of this study in order to improve potential future

research topics. The first limitation is the lack of contract information in the 1998 to 2002
seasons. As mentioned earlier in the paper, the luxury tax payments of the 1998 to 2002 seasons
were estimated based on amount of money above the given year’s salary cap. This analysis did
not take into account any contracts that would have exempted teams from paying the luxury tax.
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Therefore, in most cases my estimation of luxury tax payments were too high. Additionally,
salary cap and luxury tax data has not been released for the 2017 or 2018 seasons which limited
my data set to only four years of analysis in my ERA13 variable. This did not leave enough room
to fully estimate the effect of the increasing luxury tax bracket and repeater offense policies
implemented in 2013. Moreover, in my analysis I assume that any luxury tax payment equates to
an addition of talent. In other words, the team is automatically better off after paying the luxury
than before adding talent and paying the luxury tax. Although this is mostly true, this assumption
is not always the case. An example of a team who paid the luxury tax and did not improve
performance was the 2014 Brooklyn Nets who paid a record $90.6 million and lost in the second
round of the playoffs (Basketball Reference, 2017). In the previous year they only paid $12.9
million in luxury tax and similarly made it to the first round of the playoffs. If my assumption
was correct, the team who paid the most luxury tax in NBA history should be the best team as
well, which is clearly not the case.

7.3

Future Research
My paper opens up several opportunities for future research in the NBA. Other papers

can attempt to fill the gaps of omitted variables in my model to try to better explain change in
competitive balance. Additionally, all measures of competitive balance have fundamental flaws
so an analysis of different measures of competitive balance would be an interesting addition.
Moreover, an addition to this topic would be the implementation of the distinction between profit
and win maximizing owners into the model as this could have an impact on which teams pay the
luxury tax. Lastly, future research could attempt to increase the sample size of the pre-luxury tax
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era along with the most recent NBA seasons in order to capture and more clear snapshot of
competitive balance in the NBA.

7.4

Conclusion
Competitive balance has been an issue in the NBA for years. This problem has only been

exacerbated with the introduction of the new super team era in 2010. Past literature has proven
that if the talent level between teams is too uneven, and game outcomes are too predictable, then
spectators will not watch. The NBA has created several policies including the salary cap and
luxury tax in order to combat competitive imbalance within the league. Although most
economists suggest these policies should improve competitive balance, the NBA is still the least
competitive major sport in North America even 14 years after the implementation of the luxury
tax. This paper provides evidence that the luxury tax has improved competitive balance in the
last 19 years, but has clearly not had enough of a substantial effect. Although there is an
abundance of literature on the effect of a salary cap on competitive balance in sports leagues, this
is the first paper that implements economic theory and available data on how the luxury tax has
affected competitive balance in the NBA. More research needs to be completed in order to truly
gauge the effectiveness of a luxury tax, but the results of this analysis provide an insight to its
potential.
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